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ABSTRACT 
An electronic physical security system will often fail to meet user expectations or even 
basic needs. The inability to easily determine if the system is effective is a key symptom 
of this failure. This paper explored the process for development, implementation and 
testing of an electronic security solution. This was accomplished by asking “What is a 
simple and repeatable systems engineering process that promotes an effective electronic 
physical security system?” An effective solution was not identified within the literature 
review process. The Requirements, Alternative, Design, Implementation, Testing and 
Commissioning (RADITC) process was developed as an alternative solution for the 
development and validation, from requirements to testing, of an effective physical 
security solution. The new process is based on two existing processes. The first is a 
commercial best practice as articulated by Thomas J Whittle. This provides a good 
foundation of activities. A second more complex life cycle management process used by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
provided steps and concepts that are missing from the commercial best practices in use 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  THE PROBLEM ..............................................................................................2 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................3 
C.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................3 
1.  Physical Security ..................................................................................3 
D.  PERFORMANCE ISSUES .............................................................................4 
1.  False Alarm...........................................................................................4 
2.  Engineering Process .............................................................................5 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7 
A.  DEFINING ELECTRONIC SECURITY EXPERTS...................................7 
B.  ELECTRONIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .........................................8 
C.  ASTM ..............................................................................................................10 
D.  SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES ..................................................10 
E.  THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) ..................12 




A.  DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL ...................................................................19 




IV.  ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................23 
A.  COMMERCIAL BEST PRACTICE ...........................................................23 
B.  LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.................................................25 













B.  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ..........................................................40 
  viii
1.  DOTMLPF..........................................................................................40 
C.  FURTHER STUDIES ....................................................................................41 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................43 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................49 
 
  ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Systems Engineering Process (From DAU, 2001) ............................................6 
Figure 2.  Sandia Process .................................................................................................11 
Figure 3.  Commercial Method ........................................................................................24 
Figure 4.  Life Cycle Management System ......................................................................26 
Figure 5.  RADITC Process .............................................................................................29 
Figure 6.  DOTMLF (From FM1 p. 57) ...........................................................................41 
 
  x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
ASIS  American Society of Industrial Security 
CCTV   Closed Circuit Television 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CPNI  Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure  
CPP  Certified Protection Professional 
DAU  Defense Acquisition University 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DOD   Department of Defense 
DOTMLFP Doctrine Organizations Training Material Leadership and Education  
  Personnel and Facilities 
ESS  Electronic Security Systems 
ICD  Initial Capabilities Document 
ID  Identification  
NISCC National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre 
PCI  Professional Certified Investigator 
PPS  Physical Protection System 
PSP  Physical Security Professional 
RADITC Requirements Alternative Design Implementation Testing and   
  Commissioning 
S&T  Science and Technology 
SAFETY  Act Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technology Act 
SAVER System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders 
SPF  Security Policy Framework 
UK  United Kingdom 
  xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper explored the process for development, implementation and testing of an 
Electronic Security Solution. One way to measure the effectiveness of a facilities 
protection effort is to have clearly defined end users’ needs and successfully test the 
system against those needs. The solution is only effective when you meet these needs. An 
Electronic Security System (ESS) is the combination of the individual electronic security 
components working as a single entity within a larger security plan. Some of the common 
electronic ESS components are video surveillance cameras, identification (ID) card 
readers, motion detectors with many other sensors and related software. 
There are significant costs associated with security solutions. The world security 
services marketplace is expected to grow past the $218 billion mark in U.S. dollars by 
2014 (The Freedonia Group, 2011, p. 4). By that same year, the electronic security 
equipment marketplace world demand will exceed $99 billion U.S. dollars (The 
Freedonia Group, 2010, p. 4). According to Keating (2010), by 2017, “Governments and 
institutions will spend $3.8 billion annually on security systems” (p. 1). In 2002 the local 
law enforcement community in the United States responded to 36 million calls resulting 
from electronic security systems with the false alarms costing an estimated $1.8 Billion 
(Sampson, 2001, p. 7). That translates into the equivalency of 35,000 full-time police 
officers nationwide doing nothing but responding to false alarms from electronic security 
systems (Sampson, 2011, p. 8).  
There is no literature on ESS requirements as an engineering activity like those 
found in the software or other industries. Most security development and implementation 
processes begin with a variation of a survey or risk assessment and go directly into 
defining a set of solutions as the end user requirements. A security expert must assume 
what the end users security needs are within these processes or surveys. A design is then 
completed based on this expert opinion. The system is tested and accepted validating the 
design was installed properly. This results in the installed perceived solution being 
validated as effective and not the actual end user security needs being solved.  
  xiv
The Requirements, Alternative, Design, Implementation, Testing and 
Commissioning (RADITC) process was developed based on a common industry practice 
and the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistic Life Cycle 
Management System. These are requirements development, analysis of alternatives, 
design, implementation, test and ending with the commission of the final solution. This 
could be used by anyone who has basic management skills but may require an additional 
detailed support package for some of the steps provided by different certified 
professionals. All of the steps can be modified for each specific problem set or issues, but 
the steps themselves and the order they fall in are recommended for a successful 
implementation of this method. The method results in a tested system based on end-user’s 
needs. Further validation or testing of the needs during the systems useful life can ensure 




We spend our time searching for security and hate it when we get it. 
–John Steinbeck 
 
An Electronic Security System (ESS) is the combination of the individual 
electronic security components in its entirety working as a single entity within a larger 
security plan. Some of the common electronic components of an ESS are video 
surveillance cameras, identification (ID) card and biometric readers, motion detectors 
with many other sensors and related software. Electronic security systems serve to detect 
and delay intruders to increase the likelihood that end users will have enough time to 
assess the threats and deploy responders in time to thwart an attack if needed (Sandia 
National Laboratories, 2012).  
The English inventor Tildesley invented the first modern electronic security 
device in the early eighteenth century (Seungmug, 2008, p. 26). Since then, practitioners 
and professionals of all varieties have been looking for ways to use these new tools to 
solve security and life safety issues. Some of them have been looking for a problem for 
the newest and greatest electronic security solution to solve while others are looking to 
install an electronic solution because they believe not having one is the problem. Few of 
these experts ask exactly what does the end user need solved and how will it interact with 
the daily activities of the entire entity requiring a solution.  
There is a limited amount of research on Electronic Security Systems, and it is 
unclear if the systems widely used today are providing a value compared to the cost or 
even increase security. A large amount of money is being expended on electronic security 
systems and false alarms or system malfunctions are a clear problem. This thesis focused 
on the process used in developing the initial needs and the solution through testing of 
those needs within the final solution.  
Many of the practitioners in Electronic Security are self-certified experts based on 
years of performing the art of security and not based on any formal higher degree in 
security, certification or applications of scientific methods that result in a replicable 
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solution. As in many art forms, the expert is always right and few times do different 
experts with different background end up with the similar solution to the same problem.  
A. THE PROBLEM 
Shortly after September 11, 2001, most of the companies listed in the New York 
Stock Exchange lost value and some industries lost a significant percentage of business 
along with the downturn in value. However, companies like L-3 Communications 
Holdings Inc. (NYSE: LLL), URS Corp (NYSE: URS), Siemens (NYSE: SI) and 
Lockheed Martin Corp (NYSE: LMT) all made significant gains within the weeks and 
months after the attack (Google, 2012). These companies were well suited for the new 
burgeoning age of spending on electronic security systems. The world security services 
marketplace is expected to grow past the $218 billion mark in U.S. dollars by 2014 (The 
Freedonia Group, 2011, p. 4). By that same year, the electronic security equipment 
marketplace world demand will exceed $99 billion U.S. dollars (The Freedonia Group, 
2010, p. 4). According to Keating (2010), by 2017, “Governments and institutions will 
spend $3.8 billion annually on security systems”. As seen with the problems of false 
alarms, the results have not drastically improved compared with the ability of the core 
units of these electronic systems.  
Often a system will fail to meet user expectations, or even basic needs, because 
the supplied requirements were incomplete, inconsistent, mistaken, uninteroperable or 
simply unmanageable (Edwards, Flanzer, Terry & Landa, 1995, p. 278). Many issues are 
a result of undocumented requirements or assumptions on the part of the system 
designers that lead to mistaken, inconsistent, ambiguous, incomplete or forgotten 
requirements (Edwards, Flanzer, Terry & Landa, 1995, p. 278). Many physical security 
measures did not meet the users security needs because the implications of what was 
needed were not fully thought through (Spaight, 2000, p. 64). A good requirement should 
provide the link between the needs and the procurement process and they are easy to 
consider in principle but hard to develop in practice (Spaight, 2000, p. 64).  
Many studies pointed out that poor system design; implementation, poor training 
and integration into daily activities are the common causes for most of the false alarms by 
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electronic security systems (Sampson, 2011, p. 9). A system based on a solid set of 
requirements that are integrated into the facility or organizational operations should 
overcome most of these challenges. This will increase security, lessen cost, strengthen the 
surrounding community and perform the missions electronic security systems are created 
to solve. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is a simple and repeatable systems engineering process that promotes an 
effective electronic physical security system? 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. Physical Security 
Physical security, or more specifically, the use of access controls where used as 
early as 1000 BC in China where a system was developed to control access to the 
imperial palace with different types of ornate rings (Snyder & Neil, 1989, p. 26). A 
physical security system refers to the protection of building sites and equipment from 
theft, vandalism, natural disaster and man-made catastrophes (Szuba, 1998 ). Physical 
security works best when it has more than one layer of protection surrounding a target, 
with each layer comprising of one or more elements (Gordon & Wyss, 2005, p. 7). These 
elements can be physical structures, processes, people or ESS. 
Physical security measures aim to detect and possibly prevent a direct assault on 
premises or reduce the potential damage and injuries that can be inflicted should an 
incident occur (Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2012). Having a 
security solution is deterrence. An overall physical security solution is comprised of three 
major functions: detection, delay and response. A key item within detection is Electronic 
Security Systems (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2001, p. 6-1).  
Electronic security is a key element of physical security. The modern electronic 
systems provide increasingly better system design possibilities for varying applications, 
improving with the growth and expansion of the commercial electronics marketplace. 
Recent technological advances provide advantages such as new capabilities, faster 
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detection and response rates, greater ease of operation and lower error margins, thereby 
offering better security (Hoffman, 1989, p. 74). These are fundamental ingredients to all 
security efforts. Without this foundation of electronic security systems, security can be 
considerably more difficult, if not impossible, to effectively implement.  
D. PERFORMANCE ISSUES 
The base technology of electronic security systems has followed the growth of 
communications and Internet Technology. This has revolutionized security systems 
design, detection, communications and monitoring abilities. Technology continues to 
advance and will continue to foster new electronic security capabilities. Detection 
equipment continues to develop as well, with more sophisticated devices and more 
reliable sensors providing better sensitivity and greater security abilities (DGA Security 
Systems, 2012, p. 1). ESS leverages the growth in consumer electronics, and this increase 
in capabilities and reliability should provide these same increases in the electronic 
security applications and results. 
1. False Alarm 
False alarms are also known as nuisance alarms, false activation, false dispatches, 
false trigger or unknown alarm activations. False alarms are those created by electronic 
security systems that do not show an actual or attempted intrusion (Ohlhausen Research I, 
1993, p. 6). False alarms comprise 95 to 98 percent of all alarm calls to police dispatchers 
(Ohlhausen Research I, 1993, p, 6). In 2002, the local law enforcement community in the 
United States responded to 36 million calls resulting from electronic security systems 
with the false alarms costing an estimated $1.8 Billion (Sampson, 2011, p. 7). That 
translates into the equivalency of 35,000 full-time police officers nationwide doing 
nothing but responding to false alarms from electronic security systems (Sampson, 2011, 
p. 8). Mark Twain made it clear in his 1880 short story, The McWilliamses and the 
Burglar Alarm that false alarms were already well-known attributes to even the early 
electronic security systems (Twain, 1922). 
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2. Engineering Process 
There are many process, best practices, standards and models that exist that 
describe what is commonly known as a design or development process. These all have 
different naming conventions but are basically a form of an engineering process that 
essentially details how electronic security systems are designed and implemented. The 
Systems Engineering Process, displayed in Figure 1, is a Department of Defense 
comprehensive, iterative and recursive problem solving process, for transforming needs 
and wants into a set of system product and process descriptions. (DAU, 2001). This is a 
typical engineering process. This process typically begins by identifying the problem and 
associated stakeholders. The problem is then properly defined and refined to ensure it 
properly describes the customer’s needs (Letourneau, 2009, p. 8). These are documented 
in the needs document and are used as a baseline for the entire design and development 
effort and become the eventual goal of the system under consideration. In the simplest 
terms, this seeks to take what the customer wants and needs through a methodical 
process, eventually providing them with a product or process definition that meets the 
needs at a given level of development. Following a predefined process to design, 
development, implement and test any major or important system is a common, if not 

















Figure 1.   Systems Engineering Process (From DAU, 2001) 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Look for something, find something else, and realize that what you've 
found is more suited to your needs than what you thought you were 
looking for. –Lawrence Block 
There are a number of academic studies on gathering requirements in many 
disciplines. The literature around system development for electronic security is limited. 
The review looked at how the ESS industry defines what an expert is, what requirements 
are along with a look at a couple of different representative approaches to ESS. These 
representative best practices are from Sandia National Labs, the United States 
Departments of Homeland Security and Defense along with The United Kingdom. 
A. DEFINING ELECTRONIC SECURITY EXPERTS 
Industrial security practitioners charged with government-mandated protective 
measures for military critical commercial infrastructure created the American Society of 
Industrial Security (ASIS) in 1955 (Seungmug, 2008, p. 20). They currently advertise 
over 38,000 members and 200 local chapters worldwide on their website, 
www.asisonline.org. In 1972, the organization concluded that industry credentials are 
required, if the vocation or art form of security was to become a profession (ASIS, 2012). 
After approval of the Department of Defense, the organization created the first board 
certified designation and certification program. The certifications from this program were 
awarded the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designation under Support Anti-
Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technology (SAFETY) Act of 2002 and are accredited 
by the National Standards Institute (ANSI) (ASIS, 2012).  
Now known just as ASIS International, this organization has developed three 
industry certifications. The original certification provided is the Certified Protection 
Professional (CPP), and it is for security managers. The other two board certification 
designations started in 2002 (ASIS, 2012). The Professional Certified Investigator (PCI) 
is centered on private investigators. The Physical Security Professional (PSP) board 
certified designation is centered on those in the field who have a primary responsibility 
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for physical security assessments, the application, design and integration of physical 
security systems and measures (ASIS, 2012). Less than nine thousand individuals 
worldwide have met the minimum requirements and have been awarded one or more of 
the three board certification designations under this program (ASIS, 2012). 
There is a large number of training and certifications available from the 
manufactures of the electronic security equipment. As an example, Pelco by Scheider 
Electric maintains a global training institute that maintains a virtual, along with several 
brick and mortar campus and provides an onsite technical training service (Pelco, 2012). 
They are a large traditional security camera manufacturer and have certifications to 
support sales and design teams within the entire product suite along with individual 
product specific certification and training for the technical installation and service teams. 
This is typical for most of the major equipment manufactures. These product 
certifications are normally required by the manufactures for the design and installation 
companies to purchase equipment, maintain the manufacturers warranty and support 
provided by them.  
Many industry ESS experts present these individual product certifications as 
evidence of industry or market knowledge. In fact, these are limited to the specific 
manufactures or individual product lines of a single manufacture. Too many practitioners 
use this limited knowledge base and the prevailing processes that reply on them to 
develop sound security solutions. This easily results in the solution meeting the 
capabilities of the manufacturer’s features the individual has been certified on and not on 
the actual needs of the end user.  
B. ELECTRONIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
A significant amount of time and work can be saved if an expert jumped straight 
to the solution without defining the problem. If shortcuts are taken, the solution may not 
be the best choice among possible alternatives or, even worse we are likely to find that 
the solution does not solve the problem, if not make it worse (Cellucci, 2008, p. 8). 
Gathering the correct requirements from all the stakeholders of a system is so important 
to Congress for the Department of Defense (DoD) that oversight councils and other 
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related activities have been codified in law under 10 U.S.C. 181 and other acquisition 
related laws and regulations regarding the development of new systems (Cornell 
University, 2012, p. 1). The DoD defines a requirement within the acquisition process as 
a statement that defines a product or process operational, functional, or design 
characteristic or constraint, which is unambiguous, testable or measurable, and necessary 
for product or process acceptability (Defense Acquisition University, 2008). Such a 
requirement is considered a crucial component to understand what a system design 
should accomplish. 
A common and basic definition for a requirement is something that is needed 
(Oxford University, 2012). In practice, there are many different types of requirements 
that all fit within this larger definition. It may also be said that a good requirement will be 
correct, feasible, necessary, prioritized, unambiguous, verifiable and solution agnostic 
(Wiegers, 1999). Some of the more common types are: functional, performance and 
operation (Project Performance International, 2011).  
Functional requirements state what the system should do (Halligan, 2012, p. 2). 
This captures the intended behavior of the system. This behavior may be expressed as 
services, tasks or functions the system is required to perform (Malan, 2012, p. 2). In the 
security context, functional requirements may state the need to identify users entering a 
specific room or location.  
Operational requirements identify the essential process or series of actions to be 
taken in order to address mission area deficiencies, evolving applications or threats, 
emerging technologies, or system cost improvements (Mitre, 2012, p. 1). These typically 
involve integration with the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of the location under 
consideration. An example of an operational requirement could state the need to ensure 
the proposed new system does not increase labor force cost over the current staffing 
models.  
Performance requirements state how well the system is to complete the desired 
task (Halligan, 2012, p. 2). A performance requirement is generally defined in terms of 
degree, rate, quantity, quality, timeliness, and so on (Argospress, 2012, p. 1). A good 
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example could list the accuracy of detection and in the security context to require the 
security design to ensure that the detection rate at the entrance shall be 100 percent 
accurate. 
A good security requirement will include the characteristics of many different 
types of requirements but not include the solution or technical characteristics of a 
proposed solution. Technical characteristics within the solution will not facilitate 
technical and nontechnical alternatives when looking for a final resolution. The solution 
is defined after all of the requirements have been identified and validated in any standard 
system engineering or design process. A solid security requirement for an entrance to a 
room may read: There is a need to identify all individuals entering this specific area with 
a 100 percent detection rate, accurately capture the date and time of entrance, 
incorporating the current security identification process used at the facility while not 
increasing current staffing levels.  
C. ASTM 
ASTM International (ASTM), formerly known as the American Society for 
Testing and Materials, is globally recognized for the development and maintenance of 
standards. ASTM defines a specification as an explicit set of requirements 
(www.astm.org). A specification may contain a system design and architecture but these 
are not interchangeable documents. They typically categorized requirements in two 
distinct groups as functional and nonfunctional. Functional requirements capture the 
intended behavior of the system  (Bredemeyer Consulting, 2012). This would answer the 
question: ”What should the system do?” Nonfunctional requirements captured the criteria 
that can be used to judge the operation of a system (Malan, 2001). This answer the 
question: “What should a system be?” Good clear sets of requirements are the foundation 
of any security system. 
D. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 
Sandia National Laboratories is recognized as a center of excellence related to 
physical protection systems by the Departments of Defense and Energy. The Laboratories 
are managed by the Sandia Corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed 
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Martin Corporation. They have a mature process for system design and evaluation that 
was first developed to protect nuclear assets. This process is used as the reference for 
many current practices and concepts related to securing a fixed location against physical 
threats. According to Sandia, “A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, 
procedures, and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage, 
or other malevolent human attacks” (Garcia, 2001, p. 1). An Electronic Security System 
(ESS) is a significant component within a physical protection system. Figure 2 shows the 
Sandia process that follows a three-step process: Determine the PPS objectives, design 
the PPS and analyze the design.  
 
Figure 2.   Sandia Process 
Determining the PPS objective is the closest step in the process that determines 
the requirements for the security solution. This initial step requires the understanding of 
the facility. This is completed by a review of the facility design, layout and construction 
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along with any other operations or conditions that may affect the physical protection 
system. The next two steps described in Figure 2 appear relatively straightforward. 
Determining the threat and determining what potential targets may exist in the facility. 
All these factors combined are used to help design the PPS. There is no step in this 
process to specifically identify and document requirements. There is an implied 
assumption in many of the associated writings that the determined objectives process 
provides the necessary requirements without specifically identifying them as such. This is 
based on the next step of the process being the actual design of the PPS. Any design 
process needs a baseline requirement of some order to be a relevant design or solution. At 
no time does the process verify the system works as required.  
This process works well for a highly technical and capable security team that is 
highly trained, certified and working within a controlled environment. It assumes the 
design team can define the end users need and successfully incorporate them into the 
systems objectives based on observations and not interactions or actual input from the 
end users or other stakeholders. A possible solution to mitigate this could be the addition 
of something associated with the generation of the end users needs that would be the 
foundation of the PPS objectives along with other security related activities. The needs 
identification step is not defined and no artifacts are provided that clearly delineates the 
system’s ultimate goals. The process goes right from gathering generic background and 
location information into system design with no ability to determine success or whether 
actual needs are met and incorporated into the facilities daily operations. 
E. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) 
The United States Department of Homeland Security has several activities that are 
relevant to a methodology for determining and validating requirements. The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the System Assessment and 
Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program to assist emergency responders 
making procurement decisions. Located within the Science and Technology (S&T) 
Directorate of DHS, the SAVER Program conducts objective assessments and validations 
of commercial equipment and systems and provides those results along with other 
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relevant equipment information to the emergency response community in an 
operationally useful form (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012, p. 1). SAVER 
Reprints are reports produced by the Department of Homeland Security and can be found 
at https://www.rkb.us/saver/.  
One of the SAVER reports titled CCTV Technology Handbook has a chapter on 
system design. The report uses terms like functional and operational requirements 
(SPAWAR, 2006). “Once the surveillance or access control functional requirements are 
identified, the operational requirements must be analyzed in detail to define what 
information the system will be expected to provide under the existing operating 
conditions (SPAWAR, 2006, p. 5).” Although these terms are used throughout the 
document, they are not defined, described or used in a means that allows the reader to 
understand what they are and how to create them. These reports are considered industry 
best practices and include the applications of some electronic security technology.  
F. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has several documents related to electronic 
security systems applications and requirements. These are a compilation of the current 
best practices and mandates associated with electronic security systems. The largest both 
in size and use is the FM 3-19.20 Physical Security Manual. This is referenced by many 
internal and external organizations and is intended to be the one-stop physical security 
source (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2001, p. vi). It has a focus on an effective 
partnership between engineers and physical-security personnel (U.S. Army Military 
Police School 2001, p. 3–1). They view the separation of roles as a good concept for the 
development of requirements and the design of the system. This is important because is 
distinguishes that there are different roles and skill sets required between the 
development of requirements and the design of a system. The manual describes the Army 
policy that the use of standard preapproved systems, if possible and available, as the 
preferred method (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2001, p. 6–1). This is important, 
since the preapproved systems are based on technical ability, not operational need. In 
effect, they have a predefined solution looking to fit all of their electronic security needs.  
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The end users of the Army manual will find the implementations of these systems 
are based on general requirements tailored to a site-specific mission and physical profile 
(U.S. Army Military Police School 2001, p. 6–2). The determination on what makes up a 
site-specific mission and profile begins with a site survey. For this effort, the manual 
describes the inclusion of such factors as terrain, geography, climate and type of assets 
needing the security (U.S. Army Military Police School, 2001, p. 6–2). These are clearly 
components of the design criteria that an engineer should take in consideration for the 
system design. These depend solely on the skill set of the practitioner and not the process 
itself.  
The United States Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual, MCO 
P5530.14 provides the guidance they use relating to physical security and includes 
electronic security systems. They view these as consisting of sensors that signal the entry 
or attempted entry into a protected area, not the prevention of an entry (Headquarters 
United States Marine Corps, 2000, 7–3). The manual determines who is responsible for 
the system but not specifically how the design and implementation shall be completed. 
Overall, this provides little guidance on how the system will be designed and operated 
but has a focus on who is responsible for these processes. 
G. UNITED KINGDOM  
The United Kingdom formed the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) from the merger of the National Infrastructure Security Co-
ordination Centre (NISCC) and a part of MI5 (the UK's Security Service), the National 
Security Advice Centre (NSAC) on 1 February 2007 (Humberside Police, 2012). The 
Centre enables national security for the United Kingdom by providing security advice 
and guidance (Centre, 2010, p. 4). They support physical, personnel and cyber security 
efforts. The Centre advocates the production of Operational Requirements, and they are 
within the United Kingdom’s Security Policy Framework (SPF). These requirements are 
based on a process that has been successfully applied across the UK national 
infrastructure (Centre, 2012). They published a guide titled Guide to Producing 
Operational Requirements for Security Measures. This defined an Operational 
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Requirement as a statement of need based upon a thorough and systematic assessment of 
the problem to be solved and the hoped for solutions (Centre 2012). 
The Centre’s guide is designed to ensure the appropriate security measures are 
used to manage risk by the use of an electronic security system (Centre for the Protection 
of National Infrastructure, 2010, p. 2). They describe how to develop Operational 
Requirements and how they are broken down into two levels. Level One Requirements 
are based on the overall security needs and level two are more at the component level. In 
basic terms, a Level One Requirement would be an entire campus or facility area. A 
Level Two Requirement for the same location would be a specific solution within that 
higher Level One Requirement. The example used in the guidance document for a Level 
Two Requirement is a specific fence, video surveillance or access control. These require 
you to have a complete understanding of the threats to that particular campus or facility 
prior to completing the Operational Requirement generation process.  
The generation process is initiated when a security problem has been identified, 
and it is understood why it has occurred. The process end-user is asked six questions, and 
if yes is answered to one or more of the first five, then a Level One Requirement is 
developed. These are:  
 Are the existing security measures inadequate? 
 Are the existing security measures excessive? 
 Has the use of the location changed? 
 Has the threat changed? 
 The current requirements are not clear? 
If you answered no to all of the above and/or you can state the existing security 
measures are considered to be appropriate and adequate, then no action is required and 
the process ends.  
The actual development of the Level Ones Requirements requires the input of 
every stakeholder. The Centre’s guide defines stakeholder as anyone who has any interest 
in the locations security (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 2010, p. 4). 
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Everyone is provided a prefabricated checklist of questions design to ensure they have 
some level of input into the development of the requirements. They are asked to describe 
the location, assets, threat, concerns or vulnerabilities, consequences, definition of 
success, other constraints and possible solutions. These are all combined into summaries 
that are the Level One requirement for that location.  
Level Two Operational Requirements are framed around eleven predetermined 
solution sets. The sets are: Pedestrian barrier, lighting, video surveillance, physical delay 
measures, procedures, information security, hostile vehicle, perimeter intrusion, access 
control, intrusion detection and mail. Each one of these areas has their own prefabricated 
checklist for the stakeholders to complete. These checklists cover topics from areas of 
concerns, functions and vulnerabilities to constraints, success criteria and maintenance 
issues. As in the higher-level Operational Requirements, the summaries of all the 
stakeholders’ surveys for each Level One end up as the final Level Two Operational 
Requirements for the facility 
When broken down, this process is a little different from the checklist concept 
used by other entities in the United States. The UK requires the actors in the process to be 
well versed in the systems used and types of applications. This becomes a problem when 
they are only versed in one technology, or one manufacturer, or have limited to no prior 
experience in the engineering of these systems. Some of the benefits of this methodology 
are that the definition of success for the Operational Requirements is a core component, 
and that it does not heavily rely on a single individual for that single point of failure.  
H. SUMMARY 
There is a lack of agreement on defining a requirement and the ways to create 
them. An extremely limited amount of relevant academic literature was found associated 
with the Electronic Security marketplace. There is no formal ESS field of study on 
requirements as an engineering activity like those found in the software industry. Most 
processes begin with a variation of a survey, or risk assessment, and go directly into 
defining a set of solutions as the end user requirements. There are a small number of 
board certified experts actively working in the ESS field. These experts must assume 
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what the end users security needs are based on surveys or risk assessments. This results in 
the system being tested and accepted validating the design based on experts’ perceived 
solutions as installed and not against the actual end user’s security needs being resolved. 
The federal government’s integrated life cycle management system is considered 
complex for the average federal user of the system and will not easily support an activity 
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III. METHOD 
The only real security that a man can have in this world is a reserve of 
knowledge, experience and ability. Henry Ford 
An overall physical security solution is composed of three major elements: 
detection, delay and response. Electronic Security Systems are the key components 
within the detection and delay elements. These are normally integrated systems 
comprised of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), intrusion detection, access control and 
other electronic means of detecting access and intrusion within a defined location. There 
are five life cycle phases that make up these systems and all are crucial to quality. These 
are the development of the requirements, design, implementation, operations and 
maintenance of these systems.  
This thesis developed a requirements process tailored for the development and 
testing of an ESS. The desired goal of the analysis was to develop a process that is 
effective, easy to use and repeatable.  
A. DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL 
The new requirements process was based on two existing processes. The first is a 
commercial best practice as articulated by Thomas J Whittle (Whittle, 1987); the second 
is commonly known as the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
Life Cycle Management System. Both of these are important foundational process.  
Thomas J Whittle, PE shared a version of this common industry practice in his 
April 1987 article called security by design in Security Management (Whittle, 1987, p. 
57). The checklist or survey methods used by industry are this methodology or a slightly 
modified version. These are the basis for many of the commercial applications in use 
today.  
The Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Life Cycle 
Management System is the DoD and DHS Systems Acquisition Process. This is the 
process these agencies follow when they need to develop, purchase and maintain 
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everything from the largest nuclear aircraft carrier to the employee identification card 
(The Defense Acquisition University, 2009). This is based on the Defense Acquisition 
Guide and is a very complicated process to follow. Figure 4 is a roadmap of just the key 
activities within the systems acquisition process (The Defense Acquisition University, 
2009). Both of these are key components in the development of a new process. 
The new process included steps to determine the needs, develop a solution and 
ensure the needs are captured within the final solution. My personal experience played a 
key role within the development process of this new process. This experience includes 
more than twenty-seven years within the defense and security field. Within those years, I 
have held executive, program management and project management and team leadership 
positions. I have successfully developed and led security-related assessments, designs, 
processes and teams in both the government and large industry applications. I have 
served as the primary decision maker on the design and management of many successful 
large-scale security products and systems with real world hands-on experience. I 
currently maintain a level three certification in program management within the 
Department of Homeland Security and a board certification as a Physical Security 
Professional. 
B. DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS 
Desired characteristics for the new process are: simple, repeatable and effective.  
1. Simple 
Simple is the determination on the ease in which the process can be implemented 
free of secondary complications. A simple process will be easy to use with no specific 
process based training required. This will be determined by the complexity and the clarity 
of the steps provided. This will have a direct path between each point in the process when 
displayed as a figure. Each step will have a clear meaning and task. This is a key 
characteristic, since the average security professional will not use the process more than a 
couple of times over an entire career, training or consultants are costly. Most solutions 




Repeatable represents how well a practitioner can apply this same process in 
multiple environments. Process repeatability is the foundation for the operation of a 
successful process. In order to measure the success of a process, it needs to be repeatable. 
Otherwise, there is nothing consistent to measure and compare. To be able to measure 
process improvement, repeatability is essential. So, repeatability is a critical factor in 
continuous improvement and the ultimate success of a process. The types of 
environments a successful process should work include school campus, office buildings 
and small manufacturing facility. Not only should the process be location agnostic, it 
needs to be solution agnostic. Having a process that will direct a solution into a single 
technology is not dynamic or repeatable. The process will fail if that solution it provides 
is not viable in the environment the process is being applied to. In this context, a process 
that is location, technology and solution agnostic is considered to be a repeatable process. 
3. Effective 
Effectiveness refers to the level of ability of the method to obtain testable end user 
requirements and test the proposed electronic solution against them. The validation that a 
system is effective can be done by testing it against the user needs, ensuring it is 
integrating into the daily activities of the end users to improve the chances and 
opportunities it will be successfully used. The process should clearly define requirements 
by supporting the identification of the end user needs. This will facilitate the proposed 
solutions integration within daily activities to ensure the solution will be utilized.  It shall 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute security. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 
The method used to take an electronic security system from the basic needs of an 
end user to an effective system is important. It is highly possible that a large amount of 
time and money can be allocated to an ESS resulting in an unknown, little or no real 
amount of value. The new requirements process was based on two existing processes. 
The first is a commercial best practice as articulated by Thomas J Whittle. This provides 
a good foundation of activities. A second more complex life cycle management process 
used by the DoD and DHS provided steps and concepts that are missing from the 
commercial best practices in use today. This life cycle management process is commonly 
known as the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle 
Management System.  
A. COMMERCIAL BEST PRACTICE 
Interviews, site surveys and other customer interactions are all components of the 
best practice in industry to develop and validate requirements in the electronic security 
field. As shown in Figure 3, Thomas J Whittle, PE shared a version of this common 
industry practice in his April 1987 article called security by design in Security 
Management (Whittle, 1987). Versions of this are found in many best practices used by 
security professionals and are known as the checklist or survey method.  
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Figure 3.   Commercial Method 
Having a clear understanding of the customers and end users perspective are key 
to this method. What is not shown in the figure is the inclusion of customer 
questionnaires to help prepare for the client interviews. None of the proposed interview 
questions or missing steps to prepare for the interview is publicly available. Although not 
specified it could be easily inferred that these are specific to the expert conducting the 
task along with the nuances associated with the environment requiring some level of 
security. Most relevant documentation heavily relies on the expertise and opinion of the 
user completing the development of the requirements and design. This process stops at 
the beginning of the installation phase of the project. At this time, there are still many 
activities and events that will determine how well the system will function. It is clear that 
a well-designed system not installed properly will not be as effective as one that is 
installed properly. One of the ways to verify the system works as designed is to test the 
system after installation.  
According to Mr. Whittle (1987), a detailed site survey that includes 
environmental and operational factors plays an important role on the design of a system. 
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He also advocates a regulatory data search. All of this collected data should then be 
analyzed or reduced to the basic important facts to use toward the design of the system. 
The process, or what the results look like, makes it difficult to understand this step in the 
process. At this point in the process, the development of the requirements is completed 
and forms what he called generic requirements. These are used for the systems design, 
and the process moving forward to include customer feedback and additional surveys. 
B. LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle 
Management System is the DoD and DHS Systems Acquisition Process. This is the 
process these agencies follow when they need to develop, purchase and maintain 
everything from the largest nuclear aircraft carrier to the employee identification card 
(The Defense Acquisition University, 2009). This is based on the Defense Acquisition 
Guide and is a very complicated process to follow. Figure 4 is a roadmap of just the key 
activities within the systems acquisition process (The Defense Acquisition University, 




Figure 4.   Life Cycle Management System 
This large and complex life cycle management system can be broken down into 
five phases. The five phases are: Material solution analysis, technology development, 
engineering and manufacturing, production and deployment and operations and support. 
This is too complex to be directly adapted to any ESS implementation. This was 
developed specifically for the United States federal government and the required 
continual checks and balances to ensure there is a cost effective functional solution with 
as little waste fraud and abuse as possible. 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAU, 2009), the material 
solution analysis phase is the first phase a need enters the acquisition system. Prior to this 
phase an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) is created that details all the capabilities 
any proposed solution would need to satisfy under the current need. That means that the 
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end user has to have a clear set of requirements on what is needed prior to even starting 
the acquisition process. The requirements are developed by the end user communicates 
within the framework of the ICD document template. The material solution analysis 
phase will complete an analysis of alternatives, or determine what are all the viable 
solutions to meet the mission needs. At this point in the process, the government 
determines the estimate cost of the system, a development strategy, contract drafts and 
plans, system technical specifications, engineering plans, support plans, cost manpower 
estimates and other early supporting documents and decisions.  
The second phase is the technology development phase. This is the point in the 
process that the performance parameters are determined that the solution must meet based 
on the initial requirements. Technical performance specifications are developed and 
prototypes of the solution may also be found within this phase. This is the phase a design 
is completed, performance specifications are finalized and validation of the proposed 
solution will meet all the user needs. When this phase is complete, the solution will be 
ready for production. 
The engineering and manufacturing development phase is next. This is the step 
that entails all of the subprocess getting a solution from an early prototype to early 
production runs. This is the phase the solution is integrated into the regular field 
operations, training and how it will be supported is determined. The integrated system 
design is completed and any prototype is updated to produce what the baseline solution 
should look like. An initial production run may take place to ensue the proposed solution 
can be built to meet all of the user specifications. Manpower affordability and life cycle 
cost are all updated. The solution is ready for full rate production at this time. 
The production and deployment phase starts with a low rate or initial production 
run of the solution and support packages are built to ensure the solution can be 
successfully integrated and maintained by the end user community. A full package of 
support and training material for both field operations and maintenance is delivered prior 
to any solution being provided to an end user. This initial low rate production at the start 
of this phase not only provides the knowledge on how to efficiently produce the solution 
but also provides the knowledge and solution components to complete the training 
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development and implementation for the end users and maintenance personnel. Training 
prior to the solution arriving in the hands of an end user is important to ensure they know 
how to safely use it once it arrives but also how to start the initial preventative and 
operational maintenance on the solution that will be required.  
The final phase is operations and support. This is the only time in this life cycle 
management system that two phases may be concurrent. This starts as soon as the first 
production solution is provided to the first end user. This is nothing more than the 
operations and maintenance of the solution. It is normal to have a solution in the hands of 
some of the end users and production of the solution to continue for a long time. This is 
continued unit the last step of the life cycle management system, solution disposal. 
C. ALTERNATIVE PROCESS DEVELOPMENT  
Technology is in a constant state of growth in capabilities and affordability. 
According to Keating, by 2017, “Governments and institutions will spend $3.8 billion 
annually on security systems” (Keating, 2010). By that same year, the electronic security 
equipment marketplace world demand will exceed $99 billion U.S. dollars (The 
Freedonia Group, 2010, p. 4). As seen with the problems of false alarms, the results have 
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Figure 5.   RADITC Process 
The Requirements, Alternative, Design, Implementation, Testing and 
Commissioning (RADITC) process was developed as an alternative solution for the 
Development and Validation, from Requirements to Testing, of an effective physical 
security solution. The RADITC Process in Figure 5 can be broken down into six major 
activities or phases. The process takes its name from those six major activities. This new 
process is an adaptation of the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
Life Cycle (acquisition) Management System used by the DoD and DHS to acquire new 
solutions along with the commercial option. The six phases of the alternative process fits 
within the federal acquisition management system and the commercial option provides a 
good foundation for this new process. 
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1. Requirements 
The requirements development phase takes the beginning of the commercial 
option and expands it to include a well-defined result of end user requirements. This uses 
the same “rework as necessary” steps used in the commercial option but expands the use 
for each phase of the process to facilitate the validation of the solution at multiple times. 
This phase of the alternate solution provides the valid end user requirements. A solid set 
of end user requirements is a key input into the federal life cycle management system. 
Maintaining the commercial solutions approach in using the location (site 
surveys), end users inputs (client interviews) and local laws (regulatory data research) are 
important factors in determining if any proposed solution can be viable in the 
environment it will be used. This is the foundational data for any good set of 
requirements. What is changed from the commercial option is the next step of data 
analysis and reduction into actual requirements development. The generation of a good 
requirement is not data analysis but the generation of new data as well defined needs 
based on the information gathered to this point.  
The requirements development phase can be split into the data collection and the 
development itself. Data collection includes surveys of the location, environmental and 
operational conditions along with stakeholder interviews and knowledge of the regulatory 
requirements. These will provide all of the data required to understand what the root 
problem is, how a solution will fit within the operations and what conditions will impact 
any proposed solution. The regulatory data search is a key component. Many of the 
security related issues have relevant local, state and national regulations associated with 
them along with most of the possible solutions. There is also a significant amount of 
domestic and international codes and best practices that may provide justification for or 
unidentified possible solutions.  
The requirements themselves should not indicate a solution. This need to have a 
solution agnostic approach to the requirements will help ensure you have identified the 
actual problems and not just a solution looking for a home. A poor requirement could be:  
“have a camera looking at an entrance to the facility.” The actual requirement may be the 
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need to recognize anyone entering or leaving the facility at any given time. A guard with 
or without a mix of other technologies could also solve that same problem at a lower cost 
or better fit within the current constraints and operations at that location. Limiting the 
implementation to a specific solution as a requirement will limit one’s ability to ensure 
the actual issue has been solved and with the best methodology within the operational 
constraints of the location. 
Once solid sets of requirements have been created, they should be vetted by all of 
the stakeholders. This will help ensure that the data gathering activities did not miss 
anything, or there were communication issues on what the actual root problems are. This 
gives the stakeholders a second chance with a new perspective to ensure they have 
identified all the needs and have not missed any or exaggerated them earlier in the 
process. This leads to the identification of possible solutions. 
2. Alternative 
The material solution analysis phase is the first step in the federal acquisition 
system. This includes the analysis of alternative process that assesses the potential 
material and nonmaterial solutions in meeting the end user needs (The Defense 
Acquisition University, 2009). This step is not found in the other two processes. This was 
added as the next phase in the alternative solution after the development of the 
requirements. The DoD uses the DOTMLFP problem-solving construct to complete the 
analysis of alternatives. This problem-solving construct is further explored in the last 
chapter of this paper. As an example, a good set of alternatives for the requirement to 
recognize individuals entering a specific room could be the use of closed circuit 
television, posted guards at the entrance, sign-in sheets, electronic access control system 
or local personnel always staffing the room doing a visual check of all identification 
cards.  
Having the choice between mutually exclusive possibilities will improve the 
chances that the solution provided from the use of this process will meet the end users 
needs. It is also important to recognize that even in a process to develop an ESS that a 
policy change or other nontechnical solution may provide better results for the end users. 
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This step will not only provide alternative solutions that may be operationally or cost 
effective but will also validate the original set of requirements developed by the process 
are as accurate as possible. A good indication the requirements are not clear is a lack of 
nontechnical or a limited set of technical solutions developed by the process, no matter 
how cost or operationally effective they may be. The best possible solutions or set of 
solutions should be presented for stakeholder review within the solution selection 
process. 
3. Design 
The next phase in the alternative solution is design. This includes the actual 
design of a solution and the development of operational and policy interfaces to this 
solution. This follows the general concept in the engineering and manufacturing 
development phase of the federal acquisition system that ensures the solution can be 
successfully integrated into and maintained by the end user community. This is a missed 
step in all of the existing processes and is a key to the successful deployment of a 
solution in the federal acquisition system.  
The design phase is split into two major functions. The first is the actual design to 
the accepted solution, and the second is the development of the operational and policy 
interfaces. These are both key and should be done as close to each other as possible. 
These are within the same phase because these functions are not only closely related but 
are dependent on each other. A solution should be designed to facilitate the 
implementation into the daily activities and a part of the regular operations of the location 
under consideration. The solution must not only provide the desired security capabilities 
but be used to be effective.  
4. Implementation 
The implementation phase is next. This includes the actual implementing the 
solution and validation the operational and policy interfaces between the end users and 
the solution. The validation of the proposed solution is not part of the commercial model 
but key in the larger DoD/DHS acquisition framework. The validation of the successful  
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application of the operational and policy interfaces developed in the last phase is the next 
logical progression in the process. This does not define a solution is a success—just that 
it is being used within the daily process. 
Implementation involves the actual vendor selection, purchase and installation of 
the proposed solution developed earlier in the process. This will also include the 
application of the process and activities that have been developed into the regular 
activities of the end users to ensure the solution is used. A proposed solution and design 
may change when actual products and vendors are selected and as the solution is being 
installed. This is a result of conditions that may have not have been known prior to this 
phase of the process. These changes will happen if only on a small scale with little to no 
impact on the proposed solution but should be tracked to ensure that any impact they 
have is mitigated prior to the solution being accepted. The installation of a technical 
solution by electricians, low voltage technicians and possibly other construction trades is 
a key component in the long-term viability of the proposed solution and should not be 
done with little to no supervision and third party verification. Small changes made by 
these professionals in the installation phase can have a drastic impact on the operational 
efficacy of the solution that may not be visible to the installers.  
5. Testing 
The last phase commonly used in the development of an ESS is testing the system 
against the design to ensure the system was completely installed and any changes from 
the design are clearly identified. This is the second to the last phase of the RADITC 
process. This is testing against the initial requirements and not against the design or 
implementation of the design into the daily activities. Testing against meeting the initial 
requirements is the acceptance component within the federal acquisition system and is the 
final step prior to commissioning the solution. The testing against the actual requirements 
is the final effort that a solution is provided that meets the needs and is actually used on a 
regular basis. Typically this can be accomplished with a checklist of all the initial 
requirements and at least two signatures of individuals that have first-hand knowledge the 
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needs have been met. Having a minimum of two individuals in the acceptance process 
can provide the checks and balances needed to ensure nothing was missed. 
6. Commissioning 
That last step of commissioning after testing is how the alternative process ends. 
This is the final step that includes finalizing all of the ownership documentation, ensuring 
all the invoices have been paid, and ensuring the ongoing operations can be supported 
with all of the final deliveries of the process. This includes a survey on the efficacy of the 
process itself, along with the different component supplies within the process. As the 
final step, this will include all of the local closeout contract paperwork and will normally 
identify the start date of the warranty, maintenance and operations phase of the security 
solution.  
D. COMPARISON TO DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Simple 
The RADITC Process could be used by anyone who has basic management skills 
but will require a detailed support package for each step that includes all of the details to 
help with the development of artifacts for each step or certified security experts to help at 
certain times. All of the steps can be modified for each specific problem set or issues, but 
the steps themselves, and the order they fall in are required to make the use of this 
method a success.  
The alternative analysis activity can be a detailed engineering approach or 
something as simple as a basic list of all the viable solution with the pros and cons 
associated with them to resolve an issue within the current environment. How detailed or 
the format of this effort is not as important as being able to identify technical and 
nontechnical solutions for each requirement, along with the relative cost as an 
implementation and operation for each. This should provide all of the stakeholders 
involved enough information to judge what alternative solution would fit best within the 
way they operate without requiring a full design and detailed cost estimate for each 
proposed solution. Solutions should not be biased to a particular technology or distinctive 
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attributes of a specific vendor. Every problem has at least two viable solutions to choose 
from, if they are looked at from an objective point of view.  
A detailed design is the next step after the selections of the proposed solutions are 
determined. The design should take into consideration all the interfaces, needs and 
constraints based on the location in consideration that was discovered in the requirements 
generation process. The design should also include the adaptation of any regulatory 
information required and include life safety as a primary consideration. If required, 
certified personnel to include a registered engineer should endorse the design when any 
construction activities are required. Stakeholder approval is the final step in the design 
process.  
The implementation step is straightforward and should include the operation and 
user manuals, along with user training to ensure the system is fully integrated into the 
operation of the target location.  
The next major activity is a key component of the entire process. Testing of the 
system should be completed to ensure the original requirements have been satisfied. A 
common practice is to test against the design to see if the design product is installed 
properly. This requires the assumption that the design fully satisfies the original 
requirements and any modification and changes made in the implementation had no 
impact on solving the original security concern.  
The alternative process facilitates the capture of the end-users requirements. This 
ensures any proposed solution is integrated into the current operations. Testing against 
the end users needs is a separate step within the new process and the solution is not tested 
against its own design as completed. As in the commercial methodology, there is no 
requirement to be certified or a trained subject matter expert to use the process, but the 
more anyone uses any process or methodology, the easier it is to implement. There are no 
references to a specific location or technology. 
The data points are connected and simple to understand with a clear meaning or 
task. Every step is clear and easy to understand. There is no ambiguity on the order and 
inputs of each step and there is a clear path between each step. The new process is easy to 
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use. The process is not tied to or makes any reference to a specific technology or solution 
type. This meets all of the requirements for the simple characteristic.  
2. Repeatable 
For a process to be repeatable, it must be technology, solution and location 
agnostic. This has no steps in the process that requires a specific solution. Location 
considerations or location specific risk activities are not a component of this process. The 
analysis of alternatives activity clearly provides for the identification of several 
alternative solutions. An emphasis should always be on lower cost operational solutions 
prior to any implementation of any technical solution. A technical solution should always 
be the consideration of last resort. The alternative process is repeatable because it is both 
technology and location agnostic.  
3. Effective 
An effective solution is one that creates a good set of end user requirements and 
more important test the solution against those requirements. A common practice in the 
security industry has an expert determining solutions based on individual experience or a 
limited tool. The solution is then tested to ensure it meets the design requirements of that 
expert. Two key components of the DoD life cycle acquisition model are the alternative 
of analysis process and testing against the initial end user requirements. The last of the 
major activities in the new method will ensure the proposed solution will meet the user’s 
needs. The first major activity in the alternative solution is the development of end user 
requirements.  
In determining if the alternative solution proposed is useful, it must answer yes to 
the following three questions:  
1. Does it clearly define requirements by supporting the identification of the 
end user needs? 
2. Can it facilitate the integration of daily activities to ensure a solution will 
be utilized? 
3. Will it test the solution directly against the identified needs? 
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The alternative solution developed in this paper will support the identification of 
the end users needs and test against those needs. Another practice not commonly found 
within today’s modern application of electronic security systems revolves around the 
solutions integration within the daily activities of its end users.  
Too many times a computer, monitor, keypad or some other human interface in 
placed in an office or on the wall with no integration of that electronic security solution 
into any regular activity. This electronic system, along with any other item not regularly 
used, will go unattended and in time may be turned off, if not just ignored completely. 
This renders all of the cost and effort in designing and implementing a security solution a 
failure.  
Two subprocess steps are found in both the implementation and design phases of 
the new alternative solution. The design phase has subcomponents titled design system 
and develops operations and policy interfaces. These are based off of the large federal life 
cycle model and provide the framework for the integration into the regular operations 
prior to the implementation phase. The design system subcomponent is self-explanatory. 
Once a solution is clearly defined and designed, the operational policies for the use of the 
system and how they interface with the solution should be developed prior to the 
installation takes place. The identification of issues relating to the existing or proposed 
policies should be considered prior to this installation in case this activity requires a 
modification in design. Too many times a solution is developed and installed without the 
consideration of training, policies and local laws and regulations leaving the system 
ineffective, if not useable by the end user community. 
The implementation phase includes the subprocess of installation and implements 
the design and verifies integration of the solution within the daily operations. The 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I 
would spend the first 55 minutes determining the proper question to ask, 
for once I know the proper question, I could solve the problem in than five 
minutes. –Albert Einstein  
A. SUMMARY  
The majority of the processes for the development and validation from 
requirements to testing of electronic security systems are not effective or easy to use. 
This assessment made it clear that the commercial option is a viable solution with other 
considerations added, but the best solution would be the new alternative process 
developed here. Current electronic security practices start with a site survey, and then go 
directly into equipment selection and system design. This does not provide for clearly 
defined end-user requirements or testing a proposed solution against it. 
The literature reviewed associated with electronic security systems generally did 
not agree that specifications are made up of functional and nonfunctional requirements. 
They usually provided a step that included some set of questions or surveys that are 
suppose to lead into the development of a requirement. However, there is no clear 
consensus on what are the end users’ needs at each application, how to capture them or 
even consider them as part of a process to design a security system. A majority of the 
processes currently found in the literature are highly dependent on the skill of the 
practitioner to determine solutions with little to no empirical data inputs. None of the 
process found currently in use have a step that tested or validated that the system met the 
initial requirements, with no definition of what a requirement should look like or the type 
of data it should contain. The implementation of this new alternative process will enable 
those involved in all phases of a system implementation to have a clear and direct 
understanding of the actual needs. This will improve the overall physical security 
solutions developed and used by the homeland security community. 
Theories and concepts from other applications or problem solving techniques can 
make an important contribution to the process of developing descriptive end-user 
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requirements. The identification and addition of that process to the current best practices 
can enable those involved in all phases of a system implementation to have a clear and 
direct understanding of the actual needs more effectively. This will improve the overall 
physical security solutions developed and used by the homeland security community. 
Requirements define the problem and technical specifications define the solution to the 
problem (Cellucci, 2008, p. 8). Technology is not the only solution and should never 
stand-alone. Even when technology, employees and security staff cooperates, security 
can be weakened without policy and procedures supporting the security measures 
(Gregory, 1994, p. 10). 
B. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In 2006, a terrorist plot was foiled planning to destroy up to ten commercial 
aircraft traveling from the United Kingdom to North America. The terrorist planned to 
use liquid explosives for this event and this resulted in a ban on all liquids over a specific 
size on flights within the United States. According to Kip Hawley (2012), The 
Transportation Security Administration bans liquids as a policy solution instead of a 
technology solution because it could be implemented within a day, cost significantly less 
and functions as good, if not better, than any current technology available. This is a clear 
example that technology is not the only solution for security related issues.  
1. DOTMLPF 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has adopted the Doctrine, Organizations 
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 





Figure 6.   DOTMLF (From FM1 p. 57) 
This is used when the DoD is faced with a need that it has not encountered before 
and requires a solution. In this construct, the first step is Doctrine. In the basic form, this 
is consider the way things get done on a regular basis. The first look at an alternative 
solution is based on answering the question can we change the way we do business to 
solve the problem? The next consideration is organization and then training. Only after 
these considerations are made does the department consider a material solution. This is an 
important fact since a material solution is usually the first choice when looking at most 
security concerns. Leadership change or education, staffing and building are final 
considerations when looking to solve a problem by the Department of Defense.  
C. FURTHER STUDIES 
There are a limited number of scientific studies in the field of electronic security. 
There are a few studies on the effectiveness of video surveillance used in public locations 
and many studies on the ability of operators that actively monitor video surveillance 
systems. Many federal and private organizations have done site-specific test to see if an 
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electronic security system functions as advertised within a specific location or scenario. 
This research found no formal scientific studies of Electronic Security Systems providing 
an additional level of security. The RADITC Process is a new process to develop an 
effective electronic security solution. This new process will need validation with real 
world applications. Additional studies are needed on the effectiveness of electronic 
security systems as a whole.  
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